Kevin Sullivan

Meshkini: Reform or Repression?

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

The death of Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, the powerful speaker of the Islamic Republic’s Assembly of Experts, has started a conversation about whether or not this could lead to political reform in Iran.  Indeed, one of his potential successors, Hashemi Rafsanjani, has been mentioned as a favorite to take Meshkini’s place as head of the Assembly.  Rafsanjani sits on both the Assembly and the powerful Expediency Committee, and served consecutive terms as Iranian president.  He is generally considered to be more moderate and friendly to the West, although he had a key role in appointing Ayatollah Khamenei to power.

However, we shouldn’t be so quick to assume that this will lead to broad political reform in Iran.  There are a couple of problems with this argument, the first of which being Rafsanjani’s own political power.  He is widely viewed as a political insider by the people of Tehran.  His position of power and wealth was often blamed for the nation’s economic troubles, and his constituency has punished him for it:

This image of an all-powerful godfather figure has been seriously damaged in recent years. Hashemi Rafsanjani’s first major failure occurred during the parliamentary elections of 2000, when the voters of Tehran refused to give him their support, and the one time speaker of three parliaments and the winner oftwo presidential elections had to endure the humiliation of not even being among the top 30 elected MP’s of the capital. The 2005 presidential election delivered an even more serious blow to Hashemi Rafsanjani’s reputation, when he lost the presidential marathon to the populist upstart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Secondly, while the prospect of a reformed Assembly could certainly lead to some positive change, it doesn’t change the often stunted role of the body due to the superlative role of the Guardian Council.  The Guardian Council, all of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader, controls who can run for the Assembly.  Much like the Assembly of Experts exerts political power by controlling who can be appointed Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council serves as a check to their check:

The U.S. government describes the Supreme Leader as an unelected position. This contention, while incorrect in theory, is true in practice. The constitution empowers the Assembly of Experts to choose the Supreme Leader for a seven-year term. Yet, according to prominent dissident Mohsen Sazegara, "members of the Assembly must pass muster with the Guardian Council, whose members were appointed by the leader. That explains why no member of the Assembly has ever said anything critical of the leader in public session" (see "‘Lawful Crimes’ in Iran," PolicyWatch no. 999, June 1, 2005).

Furthermore, a more liberal Assembly of Speakers does not guarantee a less fundamentalist Iran.  Firstly, Rafsanjani will need to defeat the head of the "conservative" Assembly faction, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi.  Mesbah-Yazdi, a shadowy yet influential figure in Iranian politics, has quietly been grabbing power for the past couple of years now.  He also, incidentally, happens to be the mentor and spiritual adviser to President Ahmadenijad.

There are other potential scenarios that might bode poorly for the United States, in addition to any hope of true reform in Iran.  Were Rafsanjani to assume the role of Assembly speaker, it may force the country into a debate over a weaker, more compromised, Supreme Leader.  Patrick Clawson and Medhi Kalaji of the Washington Institute perhaps put it best:

If permitted to remain at the head of the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani would pose a persistent and open challenge to Khamenei. Accordingly, the assembly will likely meet soon to place a politically inactive senior cleric atop the assembly, such as Mohammad Imam-e Kashani, the Tehran Friday prayer leader. Even in that case, however, Rafsanjani’s twin posts at the assembly and the Expediency Council give him a power base from which he can maneuver to limit or replace Khamenei.

In the event that Khamenei dies, the new Supreme Leader would most likely be a compromise candidate rather than either of the two polarizing figures said to want the post: Rafsanjani, a technocrat, and Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, an extreme hardliner openly dismissive of democracy. The senior clerics, the Majlis, the technocracy, and the revolutionary power structure (i.e., the IRGC, Basij, and the foundations that control the economy) all share a common interest in a weak leader with limited ability to check them. 

Those who continue to mistakenly argue that Ahmadinejad holds no real power should thus take this into consideration.  The Iranian government serves as a collection of checks upon checks upon checks.  The formation of the Expediency Committee, a body in fact brought to relevance by Rafsanjani, shows a desire to create swifter governance and efficient policy in Iran.  Ahmadinejad is without question the most ambitious, and most autonomous post-revolution president Iran has seen so far.  He has close allies in both the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council.  He is tied in with all of the Principlist factions in Iran, and shares their vision for a return to Islamic government, as opposed to Islamic republicanism. 

In fact, the reason Khamenei even started his Foreign Policy Committee was to buck the autonomy of Ahmadinejad, who continues to exert his power through diplomatic field trips and sensational rhetoric directed towards Israel and the United States.  He has come to realize that power in the country can stem from the people, and then be used against them.  This is why he ran as the economic populist, as opposed to the religious reformer (Rafsanjani’s error in 2005).  This is why he will never yield his ambition for nuclear power, which is popularly supported in the country. 

The time for power grabs in Iran may be upon us, but it just might be the skilled politician who walks away from this on top.  An economy in decline, and a factitious government in turmoil, may leave a vacuum for Ahmadinejad to fill.  Whether he act upon this for himself, or for his fundamentalist taskmasters, is irrelevant.  The results would be the same, and none of it would be good for the people of Iran.