Kevin Sullivan

Nothing is truly quite as frustrating as watching war critics rush to smear those who may still believe that the United States holds a moral obligation to remain in Iraq.  Kevin Drum has served up something of the sort this week, excoriating anyone who has concerns about leaving a failed state to the tribal warlords, militias and terrorists.  Allow me to introduce you to the theory of the Chaos Hawks:

Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe.

I’m not entirely sure who it is that Drum is speaking of, but as a Liberal who ascribes to this derided theory of his, I certainly don’t believe success in Iraq is an unattainable prospect.  Drum also attacks those who followed Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn theory, apparently arguing that we have no responsibility to maintain a presence in the shattered region.  In his view, history has proven that when occupiers leave the occupied, puppy dogs and sunshine certainly must ensue.  May the historical parallels commence:

Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.   

Huh?  For pithy’s sake, I won’t even address the ridiculous Algerian example, nor will I even begin to broach the very obvious conflagration that is the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  The example of Afghanistan is perhaps the most relevant, and should in fact be our working model if we’re to ever understand what’s potentially at stake in Iraq.  In Drum’s mind (and words), the following never happened in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.  Let’s read it again:

Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe.

Geography and oil fields aside, can anyone dispute that the abandonment of Afghanistan in fact led to precisely these things?  The disorder and fractured state of the pummelled nation led to the growth of the Taliban, who returned order and stability to places such as Kandahar, while also applying arguably the strictest form of Sharia law ever witnessed in the Muslim world.  Oh, there was also that whole Al Qaeda training camps thing.

Now, a likely retort will be that Al Qaeda, much like the Taliban, is Sunni.  Since Iraq is predominantly Shi’a, well of course Al Qaeda could never truly flourish there.  This assumption is flawed however, since it relies on the unlikely notion that the Shi’a majority could pacify and stabilize the entire war torn country.  A more likely scenario is the one predicted by that bastion of Chaos Hawkery, the editorial board of The New York Times:

Americans must be clear that Iraq, and the region around it, could be even bloodier and more chaotic after Americans leave. There could be reprisals against those who worked with American forces, further ethnic cleansing, even genocide. Potentially destabilizing refugee flows could hit Jordan and Syria. Iran and Turkey could be tempted to make power grabs. Perhaps most important, the invasion has created a new stronghold from which terrorist activity could proliferate.

The Iranian power grab theory is not unfounded, nor is the belief that Turkey might feel it necessary to invade in order to quell PKK activity in Kurdistan.  Fear that the Kurds might take advantage of the turmoil and move their borders southward could lead to even more sectarian conflict, only lessening the likelihood of a national consensus upon American departure.

Point being, Iraq is far too fractured to do anything about AQI.  Their presence is undoubtedly smaller than what is often proclaimed by the administration, but it’s mostly thanks to the presence of American forces that has guaranteed that reality to this point.  When AQI extortionists and thugs are free to once again roam the Anbar Province, who will stop them?  The PSF?  The Tribes?  We’ve already seen that their ability to do this is unlikely without a little help.  With the American military withdrawn, that help will no longer be available.

I’m sure these possible scenarios fall upon deaf ears with the Neo-Progressives.  So intent are they on leaving “Bush’s war” behind, they have completely lost the ability to objectively look at the dire possibilities for the people of Iraq were we to leave too soon.  If you follow their logic, our presence only accelerates the likelihood of genocide, however our departure, if you believe Drum, would of course lessen it.  Make sense?

I didn’t think so.  Welcome to Isolationism 101.

(Cross posted at The Van Der Galien Gazette)