Kevin Sullivan

Diplomats in Iran?

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Blog posts

If true, this is very, very encouraging:

The US plans to establish a diplomatic presence in Tehran for the first time in 30 years as part of a remarkable turnaround in policy by President George Bush.

The Guardian has learned that an announcement will be made in the next month to establish a US interests section – a halfway house to setting up a full embassy. The move will see US diplomats stationed in the country.

The news of the shift by Bush who has pursued a hawkish approach to Iran throughout his tenure comes at a critical time in US-Iranian relations. After weeks that have seen tensions rise with Israel conducting war games and Tehran carrying out long-range missile tests, a thaw appears to be under way.

The White House announced yesterday that William Burns, a senior state department official, is to be sent to Switzerland on Saturday to hear Tehran’s response to a European offer aimed at resolving the nuclear standoff.

Burns is to sit at the table with Iranian officials despite Bush repeatedly ruling out direct talks on the nuclear issue until Iran suspends its uranium enrichment programme, which is a possible first step on the way to a nuclear weapon capability.

A frequent complaint of the Iranians is that they want to deal directly with the Americans instead of its surrogates, Britain, France and Germany.

Bush has taken a hard line with Iran throughout the last seven years but, in the dying days of his administration, it is believed he is keen to have a positive legacy that he can point to.

The tone of this article is rather interesting, as the author’s obvious primary concern is to highlight how this is a result of a dramatic change of heart in Washington rather than Tehran.  But the Iranians are the ones who must first agree to the European offer, which likely has some kind of a uranium moratorium as a precondition to direct discussions with the United States.  Now, we’ve been this close in the past, only to see negotiations and prospects fall to pieces.  But one must understand just how powerful and excessively mystical the Iranian leadership believes the CIA to be in order to truly appreciate how monumental this could be: The first “official” diplomatic presence since the hostage crisis.

We’ll need to wait and see what happens, but if President Bush can accomplish this, than he will have quelled his critics on the matter.  Presidents Clinton, Bush, even Reagan, weren’t capable of such a feat.  All took a much more standoffish and “cold” tact with the Iranians, often with few results, if any at all.  Bush 41 and Clinton had hoped to improve relations, but both relied on limited and poorly proportioned responses to the harmful, anti-American activities of the Iranians during the 1990’s.  President Clinton wanted to bomb the Iranians once he had enough evidence linking them to the Khobar Towers incident.  He ultimately did not, hoping that the reformist Khatami government would change Iran internally, making them more favorable to Western interests.

That obviously didn’t happen, and waiting for such reforms to happen has never been a good policy on our part.  If successful, President Bush will have achieved something none of the post-revolution presidents could do.  There could be other factors at work here–a presidential election in 2009, economic hardships, etc.  One has to believe the ability to come closer to the Europeans on a sanctions plan played a role in it, not to mention a little sabre rattling by us and the Israelis. 

And Iran aside, if Bush’s efforts to curb the Iranian nuclear program work, he will have thus neutralized, potentially, all three of the “axis” nations highlighted in his 2002 SOTU address.  For the Guardian to paint this as an American sea change really belittles just how big a step this could be in American-Iranian relations.

UPDATE

Glenn Kessler breaks down the details of the thawing in today’s WaPo:

U.S. officials said they felt comfortable making this shift because there are increasing signs that sanctions are beginning to harm Tehran, such as the decision last week by France energy giant Total SA to abandon plans to develop a liquefied natural gas project in Iran.

At the same time, however, the administration has sufficiently moderated its own position on how to proceed with talks.

In 2006, the initial package of incentives offered by the six countries included only a vague reference to Iran’s security concerns because the Bush administration insisted that section of the offer be largely gutted. The new package, by contrast, offers to negotiate extensive security commitments, including supporting Iran in “playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.”

The administration has also supported Solana’s concept of a “freeze for a freeze,” a six-week interim period for preliminary talks that blurs the lines between suspension and discussion. Under Solana’s plan, talks could begin as long as the allies halt efforts to increase sanctions and Iran does not expand its nuclear program. Then formal negotiations would begin as soon as Iran suspended enrichment.

Thus, Iran could say it only suspended its program in the midst of talks, while the United States could say talks did not begin until nuclear activities were suspended — allowing both sides to save face.

And our expected concession–halting the pursuit of further sanctions–is really a cupcake.  Sanctions aren’t easy to reach agreement on, as we’ve witnessed over the past few months.  But if this grants the Iranians a face-saving mechanism, well, so be it. 

More as it comes.  Check out memeorandum for other thoughts on the matter.