Kevin Sullivan

Cubbyhole Foreign Policy

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Blog posts

Ezra Klein on Barack Obama’s foreign policy vision:

The Egyptian Brotherhood isn’t a terrorist group. al Qaeda, a Sunni terrorist group, hates Iran and is rivals with Hezbollah, a Shi’ite extremist sect. This statement, in other words, made no sense. It was a war against Arabs, and maybe some Persians. not a limited conflict against al Qaeda. As Obama says, one of the clear distinctions between the Left’s approach to terrorism and the Right’s approach to terrorism is that the Left wants to limit the scope of the conflict, while the Right wants to expand it. So though it was only al Qaeda who attacked us on 9/11, Romney and Giuliani and McCain and plenty of their colleagues want to zoom out from al Qaeda to terrorism, and from terrorism to Islamic extremism. Rather than this being an effort to hunt down al Qaeda, it becomes a war to hunt down al Qaeda, destroy Hezbollah, eradicate Hamas, overthrow Saddam Hussein, change the regime in Tehran, crush the Muslim Brotherhood, and confront Syria, and whatever else Bill Kristol thought of while eating his Cheerios that week. It is an incredibly dangerous and incoherent approach. And it marks a genuine difference between Obama and McCain.

There’s a lot to appreciate in Senator Obama’s approach to the War on Terrorism.  He clearly understands that there are multiple threats–often operating in a very gray area of complicit networks–that need to be handled respectively.  Understanding the ideological, ethnic and religious distinctions between these organizations and states is indeed important, and it will help us to better leverage one against the other.  Understanding their petty differences and gripes could aid our efforts to target them in certain regions and isolate their access to weapons and resources.  It’s good policy. 

What Klein fails to appreciate is just how nuanced and interwoven these networks really are.  The idea that Sunni and Shia terrorists–in addition to their state sponsors–fit into these distinct cubbyholes reveals a serious misunderstanding of how these groups work.  The examples are countless, but Iran has a long record of bi-faithful terror support.  Hamas and PIJ are Sunni organizations, both of which were direct spin-offs from the Muslim Brotherhood.  Iran has not only dumped millions of dollars into these groups, but they have provided tactical support and training to them through their own asymmetric surrogate–Shia Hezbollah.  According to the Egyptians, the Islamic republic provided weapons to the Al Qaeda-linked Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya; a group dedicated to undermining and terrorizing the pro-Western government in Cairo.  These activities were allegedly coordinated by Iran and Sudan, a Sunni Arab regime with presumably few incentives to work with Shia Iran.  When the 9/11 Commission delved into the pre-attack activities of Al Qaeda, they found that Tehran was likely closer to the terrorist organization than initially believed.   

Etc.

Here’s my point: Terrorist organizations are complex and dynamic.  They share associations, overlapping memberships and often rely on the same sugar daddies.   But more importantly, they all stand on the shoulders of the groups that came before them.  They’re all bound by a sense that America’s global reach has a very visible apex, and if you press the West and expose its democratic vulnerabilities to casualties (Khomeini himself drew upon the lessons of Vietnam and how it could apply to America in the Middle East) you can repel them from Holy Land.  This is the war, and it transcends the simplistic dichotomies often highlighted between Shias and Sunnis; Persians and Arabs.  The Israelis understood this long before we got the message here in the U.S., because they have seen the ugly face of terror in all its pluralistic fervor.  Shrapnel, rockets and bombs don’t have a sect.  Sunnis and Shias alike have terrorized the Jewish state for decades.  Members of the American Left have the luxury of narrowing the “scope” of this conflict, because to them, the conflict is not existential.  One criminal and rouge group attacked America on September 11, 2001, and once we go get those bad guys in Afghanistan we can move on to more pressing concerns.

This is a terribly shortsighted way to look at terrorism.  If Neoconservatives broaden the conflict to the point of absurdity, Leftists in turn do their very best to whittle it into irrelevance.  Neither approach makes much sense.

Some exit thoughts: As I mentioned above, there are without question important distinctions to be made between terrorist organizations and their enablers.  However, would asymmetric warfare against the West be as popular a tactic around the globe today had Hezbollah and Iran not enjoyed their own triumphs in Lebanon?  Would Al Qaeda have pursued the “shell-state” model in Iraq had Yasser Arafat’s PLO not mastered the practice in Jordan and Lebanon? 

I Huff and I Post

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

The lovely people at The Huffington Post have allowed me to contribute a post to their site.  Here’s a snip:

This narrative — or rather, exploitation — of American security dominates foreign policy discourse to this day. As a result, we get this week’s kerfuffle over the imminent (or not so imminent) threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Referring to Iran’s capabilities as “tiny,” Senator Barack Obama shook the proverbial beehive that passes as foreign policy dialogue in this country today. As a result, we get rather puerile debates over the size of Iran’s economy, or whether or not they’ve acted in a fashion similar to that of the Soviets or the Nazis. Not only does this litmus blur the legitimately horrible actions of these aforementioned regimes, but it makes dealing with lesser threats far more difficult.

The reality is that Iran has been contributing to regional instability in the Middle East for over 25 years. Attempted coups, assassination plots and terrorist finance are just the tip of an unstable iceberg that is revolutionary Iran. The Islamic republic founded by Ayatollah Khomeini extended what likely would’ve been a two year border incursion with Iraq into a nearly decade’s long war of attrition against what he viewed to be the Arab apostates in the region. The plan, from the Supreme Leader’s perspective, wasn’t merely to repel the Iraqis, but to also march on Lebanon and Jerusalem “through” Iraq (also known as “Operation Ramadan”). The girth of the regime’s economy has never prevented it from exporting their revolution all over the Middle East, nor has it given solace to our allies having to deal with Iran’s surrogates on the frontlines.

Failure or Extension?

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

I’m posing this question to all 7.5 of my readers.

Approximately half of the Palestinian population is increasingly open to the idea of targeting and terrorizing Israeli citizens.  Support for suicide bombings is up, particularly in the Gaza Strip.  Ironically enough, support for their own political institutions continues to waver, while their general hatred for the Israeli people remains a constant in their lives.  This is partly understandable, considering the level of propagandizing and revisionist inculcation they’re exposed to from a very young age.  A life of constant warfare and embargo will of course foster intense feelings, too.  We should be extra critical of any polling data that comes from these territories, especially from those living in such conditions.

However, delving into this a bit further, I’m having a hard time understanding this apparent increase in anti-Israeli sentiment.  Gaza, after all, is arguably more autonomous now than it has ever been in its territorial life.  Settlements were dismantled, and although Israel obviously maintained the right to strike when necessary, there was an overall military withdrawal from the territory.  The fact that sentiments are more virulent in Gaza than the West Bank strikes me as counterintuitive.  It tells me that Gazans are smart enough to see the finite agenda of their own political institutions, however they lack the clarity to see how those institutions have crafted and cultivated popular perception of the Jewish state.  

This puts the Israelis in a precarious position, and its different than their tensions with Lebanon, Syria and even Iran.  All of the aforementioned states have a population with higher living standards, higher education, more freedom and some semblance of a middle class.  In the case of the Palestinians, you have an instance of perpetual warfare between two peoples that are seemingly irreconcilable.  Israel has a proven record of land (and relations) for peace, but not the other way around.  See Egypt, see Jordan and see Turkey.  But the overall Israeli policy (and I believe it to be the right one, incidentally) has been “you don’t respect me, I don’t respect you.”  So what we thus get is a cultural enactment of Newton’s first law: two irreconcilable forces that will perhaps only be stopped once they are made to stop (I won’t speculate on the “unbalanced force” is this analogy). 

I know this is a controversial proposal, but keeping two diplomatic ”schools of thought” in mind, I wonder if war is the only “diplomatic” option left for both sides, keeping the psychological conditions, the current tensions and the poor diplomatic relations between both parties in mind.  If you view war as a failure of diplomacy, than you probably fall in the camp that sees such an outcome as disastrous.  However, if you see war as something more linear, or as an extension of exhausted diplomacy, than you might view conflict with a certain degree of inevitability between the two.

The Conditional Hegemon

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

John Boonstra of UN Dispatch expresses his displeasure with American inaction in Darfur:

By failing to provide more robust support for UN peackeeping, to invest a deeper commitment in Sudan’s tortured peace processes, and to exert more concerted pressure on Sudan and its enablers, the U.S. has consistently watched opportunities for peace and protection in Darfur sail by. Faulting the UN for a slow-deploying and under-resourced peacekeeping mission is a bit like blaming one’s shadow. If the U.S. is going to cast stones at the UN, it would do well to remember that the UN is no more than its Member States, and that the U.S., with the huge amount of influence and funding that it brings to the world body, may well end up looking to itself, with a stone in its hands.

Yet President Bush continues to present this false dichotomy: unilateral U.S. military action, for which the American population largely has no stomach, versus a failed UN mission, which the U.S. can conveniently scapegoat for the continually deteriorating situation in Darfur. The media should call the administration out on this self-exculpatory tactic, and the U.S. should discard its smoke and mirrors and work honestly with the international community to achieve real, tangible progress in Darfur.

I can understand and appreciate Boonstra’s frustration over the lack of progress in Darfur.  But I think his critique is terribly unfair, for a whole plethora of reasons.  One, as I recently argued, it’s hard to condemn President Bush on Africa (if you want to debate the Middle East, well, there you have an argument).  President Bush had the guts to use the word “genocide” in reference to Darfur long before the blessed “international community” could bring itself to stomach the backlash from Arab states.  This issue only gained the steam it has today when the Bush administration began to address it.

Secondly, I am a little bit perturbed by this inconsistent rhetoric on American interventionism.  When calamity arises, it’s up to the United States to bear the brunt and the blame.  The U.S. has of course adapted and become good at dealing with this role, but it’s completely unfair of Boonstra to say that its invasion, evasion or bust.  The United Nations is indeed a reflection of its makeup, which is why it would be great if its absolutely disgraceful Human Rights Council would begin to take Darfur seriously.  It would also be helpful if the Arab League was convinced to take these matters seriously, rather than hosting their lavish annual summit in Khartoum; in stark defiance and indifference for the atrocities occurring directly under their noses.   

And then there’s China, perhaps one of the “enablers” mentioned by Boonstra.  In a sane world, China’s economic interests–more specifically, their continued arming of the current regime–would likely disqualify them from having any negotiating stake on the genocide in Darfur.  However, in the world that is the “international community,” they not only have a say, but they represent a deciding factor in whether or not the United Nations can take more aggressive action with Khartoum.  Under the current system, the enablers are permitted to not only enable, but to mitigate any and all solutions.  The only thing the United States can do in this situation, sadly, is lobby China like every other nation to take Darfur more seriously.  Unfortunately, Sudan sits on a long list of gripes and grievances we currently have with the People’s Republic, which also currently includes Tibet, Iran, and other matters like climate and trade. 

There’s certainly a lot of blame to go around on the genocide in Darfur, and unfortunately, a lot of it is beyond the scope of American power. 

Nonpolarity

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

Richard Haass has an interesting essay in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, wherein he addresses the issue of nonpolarity.  In short, Haass argues that unlike the pre-WW I era, the global system is now embarking on a quasi-anarchic journey that involves more than state-oriented actors; instead branching out to players such as NGO’s, large corporations, terrorists and energy providers.  It’s well worth the read, and Haass proposes a litany of ameliorating measures to help manage this new world order (such as a “World Investment Organization,” more trade, etc.).  All of his points aside, the thing that grabbed me was the question of multilateralism, and the makeup of global deliberation:

Multilateralism will be essential in dealing with a nonpolar world. To succeed, though, it must be recast to include actors other than the great powers. The UN Security Council and the G-8 (the group of highly industrialized states) need to be reconstituted to reflect the world of today and not the post-World War II era. A recent meeting at the United Nations on how best to coordinate global responses to public health challenges provided a model. Representatives of governments, UN agencies, NGOs, pharmaceutical companies, foundations, think tanks, and universities were all in attendance. A similar range of participants attended the December 2007 Bali meeting on climate change. Multilateralism may have to be less formal and less comprehensive, at least in its initial phases. Networks will be needed alongside organizations. Getting everyone to agree on everything will be increasingly difficult; instead, the United States should consider signing accords with fewer parties and narrower goals. Trade is something of a model here, in that bilateral and regional accords are filling the vacuum created by a failure to conclude a global trade round. The same approach could work for climate change, where agreement on aspects of the problem (say, deforestation) or arrangements involving only some countries (the major carbon emitters, for example) may prove feasible, whereas an accord that involves every country and tries to resolve every issue may not. Multilateralism à la carte is likely to be the order of the day.

Nonpolarity complicates diplomacy. A nonpolar world not only involves more actors but also lacks the more predictable fixed structures and relationships that tend to define worlds of unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity. Alliances, in particular, will lose much of their importance, if only because alliances require predictable threats, outlooks, and obligations, all of which are likely to be in short supply in a nonpolar world. Relationships will instead become more selective and situational. It will become harder to classify other countries as either allies or adversaries; they will cooperate on some issues and resist on others. There will be a premium on consultation and coalition building and on a diplomacy that encourages cooperation when possible and shields such cooperation from the fallout of inevitable disagreements. The United States will no longer have the luxury of a “You’re either with us or against us” foreign policy.

A lot of ideas get floated here, but I think Haass is essentially right.  We’ve seen how the UN has encountered problems in dealing with world affairs; mostly due to an antiquated framework that elevates some not-so-relevant actors, while belittling the emergent ones.  This not only affects commerce and trade, as Haass notes, but it has direct bearing on the way in which wars are waged, and what conflict will look like in the new century. 

The emergence of so-called failed states and non-state actors has handcuffed the United Nations, which approaches many of the world’s dilemmas with a “grand strategy” sort of approach, when a more focused, regional and short-term solution would often make more sense.  Because of the control over resources and energy, alliances and interests will constantly shift at the behest of external actors lacking a state-oriented mindset.  In other words, asking the “whole wide world” to make slow, deliberative and overly bureaucratized decisions on every pressing matter makes little sense, and it only serves to make states less relevant when corporations and terrorist cells can operate with a freedom that nations united cannot. 

Haass’ diagnosis is pretty sound, but in the case of global terrorism, I would also add a stronger emphasis on the true Bush Doctrine.  The enabling of violent extremism is one result of an increasingly nonpolar world, and it’s essentially a redefinition of warfare (proxy wars via various money channels, financing of militias and separatists, etc.).  We’ve seen how this has made progress difficult in the Middle East.  During the Nixon years, the U.S. relied on a “twin pillars” policy that asked Saudi Arabia and Iran to essentially police the region on our behalf.  With the states receiving internal competition for influence in the region, this kind of arrangement is no longer possible (if it ever truly was).  This may be unavoidable, which makes isolating the regimes that perpetuate this anarchism all the more important.  We should thus continue to freeze assets going towards terror, sanction regimes that knowingly attack the state system and fight these terrorists when and where it’s possible.              

Foreign Policy Orthodoxy

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

I think the only relevant point made in this New York Times piece on the “war” within John McCain’s foreign policy circle is the following:

Philip D. Zelikow, a former top adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who is not working for Mr. McCain, said it was not surprising that there were worries among the realists about the presumptive Republican nominee.

“It’s partly because McCain hasn’t settled himself in one camp, and hasn’t told Rich, you’re my man, Rich, you’re the lodestar,” said Mr. Zelikow, referring to Mr. Armitage. “But if you’re in McCain’s position, is it in his interest to settle the argument now? It’s in his interest to embrace the largest number of Republicans and not declare that he is in favor of one faction or another.”

Zelikow is, however, the only interjection of sanity in what struck me as a rather pointless and generic summary on the differences between Realists and Neo-conservatives.  In truth, John McCain has just as much diversity of thought advising his campaign as both Senators Obama and Clinton do.  The obvious assumption made throughout the article is that there are two camps in conservative circles; those who mistrust the world, and those who wish to blow it up.  I expect such silly distinctions from the far, far Left, but it would be nice if the Paper of Record could do as Mario Cuomo once advised, and write in fine-quill pens rather than broad strokes that insult their readership.

More at memeorandum    

Foreign Policy Hyperbole

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

It has become endemic on the Left, and we’re now seeing some head spinning over the ISCI/Badr organization’s affiliation with Iran:

Now, here is where things start to break down.  The Badr Organization (Originally called the Badr Brigades) was originally formed by Iran.  But according to Ware many of its members were considered to be part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.  And many of them are now considered to be retirees of the IRGC.  Which means…wait for it… wait for it…

They still get pensions from the IRGC!!  But it gets better.  The Bush Administration has classified the IRGC as a terrorist organization!!

So, just so that we’re clear on this.  We are building an army full of people who are still getting pension payments from an organization that the U.S. has designated a terrorist organization.  And we are basing our entire future in Iraq on that army.  Not only that, but when this army decides it’s going to take out its major opponent for power as it did last week, and doesn’t even tell us about it, we still back it up with air power and American troops as it stumbles.  And then we tell everybody that this is a good sign.

Now, here’s what bothers me about this logic.  The far Left is always complaining that President Bush’s “cowboy diplomacy” creates a world view that is far too dichotomous and simplistic.  All of this stuff about an “axis of evil” and “with us or against us” rhetoic is supposedly harmful for American diplomacy, and just to be clear, I agree with that criticism.

So when an actual example of foreign policy nuance emerges from the shadows, the Left begins to hyperventilate and point fingers at their token bad guys in a grand display of “gotcha” politics.  But if we really want to be fair in our analysis of the ISCI, we should start with some appreciation for their position in Iraq, and what was a long history of opposition to the Ba’athist regime there.  They emerged during the Iraq-Iran war, so yes, they’ve received years of training and financing from the IRGC.  This shouldn’t come as a surprise, since just about every Shi’a insurgent group in the Middle East has received some kind of tactical or financial support from the Quds (as have a few Sunni extremist groups). 

There’s no use in waiting for secular constitutionalists to grab the reigns in Iraq.  It isn’t going to happen.  If we’re doing business in Iraq, than we’re doing business with Shiites who have ties to Iran.  There are, however, subtle differences between these organizations (even differences in how the Dawa and the Badr organization view the proper role of Islamic government), and we can exploit these differences in order to keep Iranian influence in the region to a minimum.  Obviously, we’d rather work along side Iraqis with no terror ties; groups without any blood on their hands.  They’re simply not there.    

McCain and the Bush Doctrine

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

Joseph Loconte writes in the Weekly Standard on John McCain’s foreign policy vision:

Is McCain’s democracy agenda a stark departure from the Bush doctrine? In the fall of 2003, Bush announced a new “forward strategy of freedom” for the Middle East: an end to America’s Cold War compromise with illiberal Arab regimes for the sake of stability. McCain equally rejects the “realist” bargain; it only helped to produce “a perfect storm of intolerance and hatred.” His alternative: “We must help expand the power and reach of freedom” in the Middle East, using every diplomatic tool available. “It is the democracies of the world,” he argues, “that will provide the pillars upon which we can and must build an enduring peace.” In a judgment that is anathema to Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, McCain thus binds the struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq to America’s political destiny. “Whether they eventually become stable democracies themselves, or are allowed to sink back into chaos and extremism, will determine not only the fate of that critical part of the world, but our fate, as well.”

In this, McCain subscribes to a view of America’s national security interests in sync not only with the Bush administration, but also with any honest reading of the bi-partisan 9/11 Commission Report. America faces a global threat from religious extremists determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction to use against civilian populations. They seek the help of rogue nations that share what McCain calls “the same animating hatred for the West.” Neither diplomacy nor changes in policy can temper these hatreds. “This is the central threat of our time,” he said, “and we must understand the implications of our decisions on all manner of regional and global challenges could have for our success in defeating it.”

In other words, the “transcendent challenge” of radical jihadism, as McCain puts it repeatedly, is the lens through which the next U.S. president must view American foreign policy. Any contender for the office who rejects this doctrine, he reasons, “does not deserve to sit in the White House.”

While I appreciate the sentiment in all of this, I still fear that there’s a good deal of ambiguity to the policy.  While the McCain Doctrine seems to prioritize the hunting, capturing and/or killing of Jihadists, it doesn’t seem to lay out a broader strategy for reducing terrorism as a viable avenue for would be terrorists.  Perhaps I’m shellacking a dead horse, but I believe pretty firmly that the Bush Doctrine is sound policy in theory, despite its application errors.  Cutting off the state sponsorship of terror, isolating those regimes that continue to bankroll it, and deposing those regimes that refuse to cease in the practice or respond to diplomatic pressures makes good sense.  It makes a heck of a lot more sense than chasing down every person on the planet with an RPG and a gripe. 

I like McCain’s rhetoric, and I love the idea of the G8 and NATO getting together to start a family.  But his means remain mysterious to me, and need some elaboration.    

If the UN Were to Die…

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

…who would go to its funeral?

The United Nations was founded on the idea that a platform for global dialogue would end war, maintain global order and advance human rights all around the world.  Can we truly say that the body has accomplished this?  Aside from a select few on the extreme Left, who would mourn the passing of such a perfunctory and often pointless institution? 

Granted, the organization has satellite agencies that do some wonderful work.  But those sister agencies–such as the World Health Organization–could certainly carry on their work with a better body (much in the way the PCIJ transitioned into the new ICJ under the UN charter).   

On Doctrines

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under News

The world according to Barack Obama–according to Spencer Ackerman–seems like a peculiar one filled with cliches and misconceptions about terrorism.  I’ve always had mixed emotions about Obama’s foreign policy team.  I believe most of them are quite reputable, and even the ones I have issues with are solid in their area of expertise (i.e. Power).  There seems, at a cursory level, to be this pervasive group-think from his advisers over how a President Obama would change the way in which we do global business.  My concern is that the Obama foreign policy brain trust seems to have an almost nihilistic giddiness over the supposedly grand shift away from the Bush Doctrine that they represent.  It’s almost as if they’ve taken a hearty gulp of the “change” Kool-Aid and applied it abroad.  

Of course, the Bush Doctrine–when truly applied–strikes me as the best way to confront the state-sponsorship of terrorism.  Chasing Al Qaeda into ever cave and cubbyhole, however, does not.  A shift away from democracy promotion to “dignity” promotion doesn’t instill me with confidence, either (I think we should loosely and conditionally be in the business of both, but I digress).  The Leftists will swoon over how “clever” and “nuanced” this shift could be, but there’s no evidence that it would solve the issue of unconventional, terror-oriented warfare.  Terrorism is a classless business, and there’s no direct correlation between terrorism and poverty.  This theory is a construct made up by the Power wing of the foreign policy inteligencia, and it’s really just a way to divert support ($$$) towards their global focus (”Reduce nukes, and terror will cease! Stop global warming, and terror will cease! Give Palestinians their right of return, and terror will cease!”). 

I think the truth of the matter is that extremism will always be there, as there will always be collections of people around the world who live differently than us.  Obama’s “doctrine” may be less militaristic, and perhaps more humanitarian (although no president has given more aid to Africa than President Bush, but please don’t tell that to Samantha Power).  But the key problem with Obama’s ”doctrine” is that it comes to us prior to any kind of feasible application.  Whereas the Bush Doctrine was a direct response to an attack upon the United States, Obama’s plan seems to make more sense in a domestic campaign season than it does in practice.  I’m not suggesting that it’s all bad, I’m simply noting how underwhelming it is.  The plan still puts America in the role of therapist; ready and willing to heal the world’s problems and win her affection.  It’s just a little bit heavier on the butter than the guns.  For all the talk of his “Wilsonian” rhetoric, I think President Bush’s stated policy of isolating terror financiers is more realistic than what we’ve seen him apply since 2001 (and far more realistic than the Obama doctrine).