The US plans to establish a diplomatic presence in Tehran for the first time in 30 years as part of a remarkable turnaround in policy by President George Bush.

The Guardian has learned that an announcement will be made in the next month to establish a US interests section – a halfway house to setting up a full embassy. The move will see US diplomats stationed in the country.

The news of the shift by Bush who has pursued a hawkish approach to Iran throughout his tenure comes at a critical time in US-Iranian relations. After weeks that have seen tensions rise with Israel conducting war games and Tehran carrying out long-range missile tests, a thaw appears to be under way.

The White House announced yesterday that William Burns, a senior state department official, is to be sent to Switzerland on Saturday to hear Tehran’s response to a European offer aimed at resolving the nuclear standoff.

Burns is to sit at the table with Iranian officials despite Bush repeatedly ruling out direct talks on the nuclear issue until Iran suspends its uranium enrichment programme, which is a possible first step on the way to a nuclear weapon capability.

A frequent complaint of the Iranians is that they want to deal directly with the Americans instead of its surrogates, Britain, France and Germany.

Bush has taken a hard line with Iran throughout the last seven years but, in the dying days of his administration, it is believed he is keen to have a positive legacy that he can point to.

The tone of this article is rather interesting, as the author’s obvious primary concern is to highlight how this is a result of a dramatic change of heart in Washington rather than Tehran.  But the Iranians are the ones who must first agree to the European offer, which likely has some kind of a uranium moratorium as a precondition to direct discussions with the United States.  Now, we’ve been this close in the past, only to see negotiations and prospects fall to pieces.  But one must understand just how powerful and excessively mystical the Iranian leadership believes the CIA to be in order to truly appreciate how monumental this could be: The first “official” diplomatic presence since the hostage crisis.

We’ll need to wait and see what happens, but if President Bush can accomplish this, than he will have quelled his critics on the matter.  Presidents Clinton, Bush, even Reagan, weren’t capable of such a feat.  All took a much more standoffish and “cold” tact with the Iranians, often with few results, if any at all.  Bush 41 and Clinton had hoped to improve relations, but both relied on limited and poorly proportioned responses to the harmful, anti-American activities of the Iranians during the 1990’s.  President Clinton wanted to bomb the Iranians once he had enough evidence linking them to the Khobar Towers incident.  He ultimately did not, hoping that the reformist Khatami government would change Iran internally, making them more favorable to Western interests.

That obviously didn’t happen, and waiting for such reforms to happen has never been a good policy on our part.  If successful, President Bush will have achieved something none of the post-revolution presidents could do.  There could be other factors at work here–a presidential election in 2009, economic hardships, etc.  One has to believe the ability to come closer to the Europeans on a sanctions plan played a role in it, not to mention a little sabre rattling by us and the Israelis. 

And Iran aside, if Bush’s efforts to curb the Iranian nuclear program work, he will have thus neutralized, potentially, all three of the “axis” nations highlighted in his 2002 SOTU address.  For the Guardian to paint this as an American sea change really belittles just how big a step this could be in American-Iranian relations.

UPDATE

Glenn Kessler breaks down the details of the thawing in today’s WaPo:

U.S. officials said they felt comfortable making this shift because there are increasing signs that sanctions are beginning to harm Tehran, such as the decision last week by France energy giant Total SA to abandon plans to develop a liquefied natural gas project in Iran.

At the same time, however, the administration has sufficiently moderated its own position on how to proceed with talks.

In 2006, the initial package of incentives offered by the six countries included only a vague reference to Iran’s security concerns because the Bush administration insisted that section of the offer be largely gutted. The new package, by contrast, offers to negotiate extensive security commitments, including supporting Iran in “playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.”

The administration has also supported Solana’s concept of a “freeze for a freeze,” a six-week interim period for preliminary talks that blurs the lines between suspension and discussion. Under Solana’s plan, talks could begin as long as the allies halt efforts to increase sanctions and Iran does not expand its nuclear program. Then formal negotiations would begin as soon as Iran suspended enrichment.

Thus, Iran could say it only suspended its program in the midst of talks, while the United States could say talks did not begin until nuclear activities were suspended — allowing both sides to save face.

And our expected concession–halting the pursuit of further sanctions–is really a cupcake.  Sanctions aren’t easy to reach agreement on, as we’ve witnessed over the past few months.  But if this grants the Iranians a face-saving mechanism, well, so be it. 

More as it comes.  Check out memeorandum for other thoughts on the matter. 

The Egyptian Brotherhood isn’t a terrorist group. al Qaeda, a Sunni terrorist group, hates Iran and is rivals with Hezbollah, a Shi’ite extremist sect. This statement, in other words, made no sense. It was a war against Arabs, and maybe some Persians. not a limited conflict against al Qaeda. As Obama says, one of the clear distinctions between the Left’s approach to terrorism and the Right’s approach to terrorism is that the Left wants to limit the scope of the conflict, while the Right wants to expand it. So though it was only al Qaeda who attacked us on 9/11, Romney and Giuliani and McCain and plenty of their colleagues want to zoom out from al Qaeda to terrorism, and from terrorism to Islamic extremism. Rather than this being an effort to hunt down al Qaeda, it becomes a war to hunt down al Qaeda, destroy Hezbollah, eradicate Hamas, overthrow Saddam Hussein, change the regime in Tehran, crush the Muslim Brotherhood, and confront Syria, and whatever else Bill Kristol thought of while eating his Cheerios that week. It is an incredibly dangerous and incoherent approach. And it marks a genuine difference between Obama and McCain.

There’s a lot to appreciate in Senator Obama’s approach to the War on Terrorism.  He clearly understands that there are multiple threats–often operating in a very gray area of complicit networks–that need to be handled respectively.  Understanding the ideological, ethnic and religious distinctions between these organizations and states is indeed important, and it will help us to better leverage one against the other.  Understanding their petty differences and gripes could aid our efforts to target them in certain regions and isolate their access to weapons and resources.  It’s good policy. 

What Klein fails to appreciate is just how nuanced and interwoven these networks really are.  The idea that Sunni and Shia terrorists–in addition to their state sponsors–fit into these distinct cubbyholes reveals a serious misunderstanding of how these groups work.  The examples are countless, but Iran has a long record of bi-faithful terror support.  Hamas and PIJ are Sunni organizations, both of which were direct spin-offs from the Muslim Brotherhood.  Iran has not only dumped millions of dollars into these groups, but they have provided tactical support and training to them through their own asymmetric surrogate–Shia Hezbollah.  According to the Egyptians, the Islamic republic provided weapons to the Al Qaeda-linked Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya; a group dedicated to undermining and terrorizing the pro-Western government in Cairo.  These activities were allegedly coordinated by Iran and Sudan, a Sunni Arab regime with presumably few incentives to work with Shia Iran.  When the 9/11 Commission delved into the pre-attack activities of Al Qaeda, they found that Tehran was likely closer to the terrorist organization than initially believed.   

Etc.

Here’s my point: Terrorist organizations are complex and dynamic.  They share associations, overlapping memberships and often rely on the same sugar daddies.   But more importantly, they all stand on the shoulders of the groups that came before them.  They’re all bound by a sense that America’s global reach has a very visible apex, and if you press the West and expose its democratic vulnerabilities to casualties (Khomeini himself drew upon the lessons of Vietnam and how it could apply to America in the Middle East) you can repel them from Holy Land.  This is the war, and it transcends the simplistic dichotomies often highlighted between Shias and Sunnis; Persians and Arabs.  The Israelis understood this long before we got the message here in the U.S., because they have seen the ugly face of terror in all its pluralistic fervor.  Shrapnel, rockets and bombs don’t have a sect.  Sunnis and Shias alike have terrorized the Jewish state for decades.  Members of the American Left have the luxury of narrowing the “scope” of this conflict, because to them, the conflict is not existential.  One criminal and rouge group attacked America on September 11, 2001, and once we go get those bad guys in Afghanistan we can move on to more pressing concerns.

This is a terribly shortsighted way to look at terrorism.  If Neoconservatives broaden the conflict to the point of absurdity, Leftists in turn do their very best to whittle it into irrelevance.  Neither approach makes much sense.

Some exit thoughts: As I mentioned above, there are without question important distinctions to be made between terrorist organizations and their enablers.  However, would asymmetric warfare against the West be as popular a tactic around the globe today had Hezbollah and Iran not enjoyed their own triumphs in Lebanon?  Would Al Qaeda have pursued the “shell-state” model in Iraq had Yasser Arafat’s PLO not mastered the practice in Jordan and Lebanon? 

Since the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran, Syria has consistently been Tehran’s closest ally. All that began to change when Ahmadinejad came to power three years ago. His policies and rhetoric have isolated Iran to an extent not seen in the thirty years of the Islamic Republic. Syria, the closest ally, is probably no more.

This is the most damaging consequence of Ahmadinejad’s presidency for Iranian foreign policy so far, and it could well be the beginning of worst days to come; notably the possibility of a military attack on the country.

(h/t Justin)

 

This narrative — or rather, exploitation — of American security dominates foreign policy discourse to this day. As a result, we get this week’s kerfuffle over the imminent (or not so imminent) threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Referring to Iran’s capabilities as “tiny,” Senator Barack Obama shook the proverbial beehive that passes as foreign policy dialogue in this country today. As a result, we get rather puerile debates over the size of Iran’s economy, or whether or not they’ve acted in a fashion similar to that of the Soviets or the Nazis. Not only does this litmus blur the legitimately horrible actions of these aforementioned regimes, but it makes dealing with lesser threats far more difficult.

The reality is that Iran has been contributing to regional instability in the Middle East for over 25 years. Attempted coups, assassination plots and terrorist finance are just the tip of an unstable iceberg that is revolutionary Iran. The Islamic republic founded by Ayatollah Khomeini extended what likely would’ve been a two year border incursion with Iraq into a nearly decade’s long war of attrition against what he viewed to be the Arab apostates in the region. The plan, from the Supreme Leader’s perspective, wasn’t merely to repel the Iraqis, but to also march on Lebanon and Jerusalem “through” Iraq (also known as “Operation Ramadan”). The girth of the regime’s economy has never prevented it from exporting their revolution all over the Middle East, nor has it given solace to our allies having to deal with Iran’s surrogates on the frontlines.

Let’s say you’re Iran.

You look to your east and there are a bunch of U.S. troops. You look to your west and there are a bunch of U.S. troops. You send out peace feelers, but they’re rejected. Then you get pissed off and elect a Holocaust-denying asshole as your president. You get it through your head that the people who have encircled you and who for nearly 30 years have talked incessantly about overthrowing you (again) might have inadvertently given you a gift. What gift? The gift of thinking your best friends are actually their allies? Well, there’s that. But the real gift is tens of thousands of their troops that you can pay someone to attack. You might even try to kill U.S. troops at several steps removed — like the U.S. did the Soviets in Afghanistan not too long ago.

Facts are important things. It’s not yet proven that the Iranians truly are doing this. But it makes perfect sense to me that they would. Not only have we invaded and occupied two of their neighbors, we’re involved in a worldwide effort to stop them from achieving any form of nuclear technology, we step up patrols in the Persian Gulf and we even build military bases a stone’s throw from their border. In the hands of the dolts and warmongers who both staff this administration and have their designs on the next one, the U.S.-Iran War is a Gulf Of Tonkin incident just waiting to happen. A patriotic Iranian — certainly one who works for a bellicose Iranian president — would, most likely, try to kill U.S. troops while leaving no fingerprints.

First, let’s address the “backs against the wall” theory.  The Iranian government supported anti-Taliban factions–such as Ishmael Khan and various Shi’a Hazaras–in Afghanistan, and their basic interests in the region were essentially parallel to our own in 2002 (despite the Supreme Leader’s rhetoric).  They supported the invasion of Afghanistan, and in fact believed the Taliban to be an American/Sunni plot against them!  Surely, it must trouble the Iranians to know that a hostile occupying force stands to their immediate east, but it hasn’t been any worse than dealing with the anti-Shiite factions that dominated Afghanistan prior to the invasion.  Our “occupation” of Afghanistan has been half-assed at best, and if anything, has likely made some of the Sunni factions there rethink their rivalry with Iran.  Iran applied a layered foreign policy in Afghanistan, wherein they supported dissidents, nationalists and even logical opponents (something we should keep in mind while addressing Iranian involvement in Iraq).  In short, the United States handled some Iranian housekeeping in Afghanistan, and probably forced some of their Afghan enemies to come calling with hats in hand.  Much like in Iraq, we’ve given the Iranians some regional leverage in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, the United States has provided Iran with the friendliest Baghdad government in over 35 years; perhaps even the friendliest ever. They clearly had no love for Saddam after nearly a decade of war between the two nations. The dictator that killed hundreds of thousands of their people (by modest estimates) is now gone, and with the chaos in Iraq, Tehran now has a chance to exert the kind of regional influence once only dreamed of by Khomeini.

Secondly, there’s the “Iranian peace” fallacy. Of course Iran put out “feelers” in 2003. They didn’t want to be the next target in the region. But if we really want to judge America’s policy towards the Iranians over the last five years, it would make sense to look at the overtures we made in 2005 offering Iran WTO membership and normalized trade relations. All they had to do then is what they have to do now–comply with UN sanctions, halt uranium enrichment and come to the table. Instead, much like in 2005, they choose to remain defiant. Hey, more power to them, if they trust that that’s sound diplomacy. But let’s put an end to the “Iranians wanted dialogue” meme, because it’s an absolute fallacy. What they wanted then and what they want now are one in the same–their way.

And the idea that Iranians “got pissed off” and voted for Ahmadinejad as a result of American diplomacy is absolutely absurd. The Guardians Council picks the candidates, and only 12% of the electorate went out to the polls in 2005. The low turnout not withstanding, even the few who did vote for Ahmadinejad did so on economic grounds. His candidacy was based on domestic populism. He promised to lower inflation and make lives better. Economic conditions have only worsened for Iranians (unless you happen to be an old Quds buddy) under his watch, as their lunatic president has instead relied upon nuclear demagoguery to maintain national cohesion. We’ll see if this strategy pays off for him in 2009, but his election had little, if anything, to do with American policy at the time.

There are so many other holes in Ackerman’s Iranian victimization tripe, but my fingers are tired. Let me just say this: We do need to see more evidence to determine what kind of a role Hezbollah is playing in Iraq. However, the prospect of such a thing should not come as a surprise to anyone. They did it in Lebanon, they did it in Saudi Arabia, and they provided resources and information to every two-bit coup attempt in the region; from Bahrain, to Qatar and Kuwait. There is no Hezbollah without Iran. I feel like this should be common knowledge for the BDS crowd by now, but apparently it is not. I can appreciate a healthy skepticism towards this administration on this, but sometimes, you have to look at historical patterns and determine if their repeat is likely.  Facts are important things. 

Hezbollah training Iraqis? It’s pretty darn likely.

The movement that took hold of Iran in the late 1970s was energized by an increasingly urban population, one where the words and comforting conservatism of the mullahs provided solace to a population startled by hyper-modernity. In a rapidly changing land, the familiar words from the mosque and the neighborhood prayer groups (known as hay’ats) helped grow the grassroots of the coming revolutionary wave. But the current crop of Iranian youths is different, and they don’t share the same anti-Western vigor as their parents once did. The U.S. Census Bureau has tracked these youngsters, whom today comprise the largest population block in Iran. Couple this with an 11% unemployment rate (according to the Iranian government) and a median age of 26, and the picture you begin to get is a country full of frustrated young men. The Iranian Principalists in charge of the regime understand the volatile time bomb they sit upon, making much of their paranoia well warranted. It’s an obvious example of the sad state of affairs in Iran, wherein the ruling class must fight and fear the energy and ingenuity of its young, rather than tapping into those citizens in order to strengthen their nation.

However, one nation’s failure might represent a glimmer of hope for another. A recent poll conducted by World Public Opinion found that Iranians — although still critical of American behavior — desire stronger relations, more trade, and more exchanging of ideas with their Western rivals. Rather than embracing the anti-Western rhetoric and sloganeering of their leaders, this generation of Iranians sees a future with its American counterparts. Iran’s frustrated youth offers the United States a soft-power leverage that bombs and bullets alone cannot supply. On the contrary, attacking this regime now could instead alienate the deciding generation for post-revolutionary Iran. It will be these young men (and women) who give Ayatollah Khomeini his final grade. It’s these Iranians — who in a decade’s time will be approaching their 40s and raising children of their own — whose political perceptions will be molded and formed by the way in which America engages their country. 

Read the rest here. 

Standing up to Iran is the next step. Maliki himself appeared too close to Iran in the early days of his tenure, making Sunnis and Kurds especially suspicious of the former Dawa leader. With Sadr on the run, he needs to show now that he will not tolerate Iran propping up any militias in Iraq, and he has that opportunity now. Iran may be in a position where they will have to listen; Sadr has turned into a major disappointment, and all of the Iranian interference has not kept the green Iraqi Army from destroying the inept Mahdis in straight-up military battles.

If the US wanted an ally in the region with the strength to stand up to Iran, the Iraqi mission could be heading for success. Maliki needs to crush the Mahdis to completely secure Iraq internally, and then needs to push the Iranians out of the south altogether and secure Iraq’s borders. Reconciliation appears to be within his grasp, and Iran may find themselves with a much stronger Iraq on their border than they anticipated even a few months earlier.

With all due respect to Ed, I think this is a misunderstanding of the situation as it stands today.  The other possibility here is that there’s now more cohesion than ever between Baghdad and Tehran.  We now know that the ISCI/Badr faction may be handling conscription in Iraq, essentially consolidating and nationalizing the country’s military (Iran ties or not, I believe this to be a positive move).  There needs to be one force, one voice and one nation in Iraq.  All of that is understood.

But I think that’s the case Maliki is making to the Iranians.  I am not an Iranian chaos theory kind of guy, and I have often said that their interests are in fact parallel to our own in Iraq (to a point).  The Iranians have no reason to be invested in the Mahdi Army.  The Mahdi militia, contrary to popular belief, isn’t a sectarian organization bent on violence.  They are nationalists, and they have their own internal disagreements. 

Iran is most certainly invested, however, in al-Sadr.  He’s more valuable to them as a figurehead than he is a warlord, which is why he’s spending his days in Qom.  I’ve said this numerous times: The Iranians have a better long-term strategy for Iraq than we do, and that’s why they’re winning.

Firstly, India desperately needs energy sources, with competitor China equally keen to tap Iran’s rich hydrocarbon fields. China has expressed willingness to join a truncated IPI should India keep away from it.

Pakistan has been smarting under Washington’s pro-India tilt and will be happy to accommodate China. This year, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman said, “If there are prospects of China joining the IPI project with or without India, we will welcome it. Pakistan is committed to the pipeline because of its desire to achieve energy security.”

Secondly, domestic Indian politics is a big determining factor now. Political parties will look to exploit New Delhi as a “US stooge” in general elections due in a year.

There is the fear of a backlash from Indian Muslim voters, who constitute a sizable constituency, and despise America due to its attack on Iraq and now problems with Iran.

New Delhi’s latest move can also be seen as an attempt to keep the anti-US coalition partners, the left parties, happy. Indications are that any new government next year, whether headed by the Congress, the Bharatiya Janata Party or a Third Front formation, will have to seek outside support.

It is important for the Congress to keep the left parties happy as it is quite possible that they will be needed again for the next round of government formation.

Thirdly, there is a growing view that New Delhi has to learn how to deal and balance various nations’ interests to sustain a high-growing Indian economy, in need for new markets for both export and import. India’s gross domestic product is growing at 8-9% per annum.

I can understand the administration’s concerns here, as it’s rather obvious that Iran is simply trying to buy the silence of prominent players like China and India.  However, this repeated insistence that every single country pressure the Iranians on their nuclear program is partly why the United States is losing leverage in the region.  A wiser, more long-term Iran policy would embrace the idea of the Iranians fostering economic ties with our allies.  Our own Treasury Dept. sanctions on the republic were mostly symbolic, and that’s because Iran had for years been isolating itself from Western economies–especially ours.  Weaving the Iranians into the global economy offers the West some leverage, and could put us in a stronger position to make demands a few years from now.

Their concerns may be legitimate.  Call it Tom Friedman’s “Golden Arches” rule, or whatever you may like, but there’s a certain kind of power in free markets that can’t be denied.  Having worked with children, I’ve seen the awe-inspiring power of Spider-Man.  No matter the race, color or creed, little kids love Peter Parker (and why shouldn’t they?).  All of the bombs and bullets in the world can’t move mountains–and win over a generation of young people–the way he can.  That’s why you see the use of comforting Western images in Islamic propaganda; because it enables the extremists to use such comforting images to suit their own indoctrinating purposes.