Kevin Sullivan

A Moratorium on Bad Analogies

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

Ok, so can we maybe reach a bargain here?

If we can agree that President Bush is an idiot for comparing Iraq to Vietnam, can we please not compare the possibility of American withdrawal to The American Civil War?

Matthew Yglesias has done just that, in addition to drawing a parallel with the Lebanese Civil War.  His reasoning goes as follows:

To say that our current policy is working and needs just ten more years to stabilize Iraq is lunacy — just leaving stands a perfectly good chance of working just as quickly at radically lower cost.

…

By a similar token, the American Civil War ended fewer than ten years after James Buchanan’s blunders. Ten years isn’t just longer than America has political will to sustain, it’s genuinely too long. Policies that work accomplish their goals faster than that, something that’s supposed to unfold at the speed Petraeus is talking about isn’t working at all.

“Policies that work accomplish their goals faster than that”?  This is absurd.  I would love to talk about the Korean War, and the gradual decline of Communism and other wonderful foreign policy analogies that disprove such a comment.  But NO.  No more.

As for Matthew’s examples, the Civil War comparison is just silly.  We had a central government.  We had the foundation for a liberal and democratic society already established, which is why secession from the union was bad.  The Nullification Crisis had already established this.  This was Lincoln’s rally cry, and he was right.  The Constitution was on his side.

The Lebanese example is equally bad.  The reason being is that you could flip it on its head, and use it as a reason to stay in Iraq.  The Cairo Accord forced Lebanon to allow a terrorist organization to operate within their own borders, so that said terrorist organization could attack Israel by proxy.  This “civil” war was in fact fueled in many ways by foreign elements, much the way Iraq has been exacerbated by Saudis, Iranians and other foreign fighters.

So please…let’s just stop.  Rich does a nice job of handling the “Spanish Civil War” comparison.  Bravo!

I know it’s tempting to look back.  I am guilty as charged.  But I think we’ve all gotten a little bit carried away trying to prove our own points via historical context.  I will not do this again in the future, unless I can lay out a very detailed analysis to substantiate the comparison.  Since I don’t have the attention span, nor the desire to do so, the entire enterprise is highly unlikely.

You’re probably better off.

(Cross posted at The Van Der Galien Gazette)

Meshkini: Reform or Repression?

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

The death of Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, the powerful speaker of the Islamic Republic’s Assembly of Experts, has started a conversation about whether or not this could lead to political reform in Iran.  Indeed, one of his potential successors, Hashemi Rafsanjani, has been mentioned as a favorite to take Meshkini’s place as head of the Assembly.  Rafsanjani sits on both the Assembly and the powerful Expediency Committee, and served consecutive terms as Iranian president.  He is generally considered to be more moderate and friendly to the West, although he had a key role in appointing Ayatollah Khamenei to power.

However, we shouldn’t be so quick to assume that this will lead to broad political reform in Iran.  There are a couple of problems with this argument, the first of which being Rafsanjani’s own political power.  He is widely viewed as a political insider by the people of Tehran.  His position of power and wealth was often blamed for the nation’s economic troubles, and his constituency has punished him for it:

This image of an all-powerful godfather figure has been seriously damaged in recent years. Hashemi Rafsanjani’s first major failure occurred during the parliamentary elections of 2000, when the voters of Tehran refused to give him their support, and the one time speaker of three parliaments and the winner oftwo presidential elections had to endure the humiliation of not even being among the top 30 elected MP’s of the capital. The 2005 presidential election delivered an even more serious blow to Hashemi Rafsanjani’s reputation, when he lost the presidential marathon to the populist upstart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Secondly, while the prospect of a reformed Assembly could certainly lead to some positive change, it doesn’t change the often stunted role of the body due to the superlative role of the Guardian Council.  The Guardian Council, all of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader, controls who can run for the Assembly.  Much like the Assembly of Experts exerts political power by controlling who can be appointed Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council serves as a check to their check:

The U.S. government describes the Supreme Leader as an unelected position. This contention, while incorrect in theory, is true in practice. The constitution empowers the Assembly of Experts to choose the Supreme Leader for a seven-year term. Yet, according to prominent dissident Mohsen Sazegara, "members of the Assembly must pass muster with the Guardian Council, whose members were appointed by the leader. That explains why no member of the Assembly has ever said anything critical of the leader in public session" (see "‘Lawful Crimes’ in Iran," PolicyWatch no. 999, June 1, 2005).

Furthermore, a more liberal Assembly of Speakers does not guarantee a less fundamentalist Iran.  Firstly, Rafsanjani will need to defeat the head of the "conservative" Assembly faction, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi.  Mesbah-Yazdi, a shadowy yet influential figure in Iranian politics, has quietly been grabbing power for the past couple of years now.  He also, incidentally, happens to be the mentor and spiritual adviser to President Ahmadenijad.

There are other potential scenarios that might bode poorly for the United States, in addition to any hope of true reform in Iran.  Were Rafsanjani to assume the role of Assembly speaker, it may force the country into a debate over a weaker, more compromised, Supreme Leader.  Patrick Clawson and Medhi Kalaji of the Washington Institute perhaps put it best:

If permitted to remain at the head of the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani would pose a persistent and open challenge to Khamenei. Accordingly, the assembly will likely meet soon to place a politically inactive senior cleric atop the assembly, such as Mohammad Imam-e Kashani, the Tehran Friday prayer leader. Even in that case, however, Rafsanjani’s twin posts at the assembly and the Expediency Council give him a power base from which he can maneuver to limit or replace Khamenei.

In the event that Khamenei dies, the new Supreme Leader would most likely be a compromise candidate rather than either of the two polarizing figures said to want the post: Rafsanjani, a technocrat, and Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, an extreme hardliner openly dismissive of democracy. The senior clerics, the Majlis, the technocracy, and the revolutionary power structure (i.e., the IRGC, Basij, and the foundations that control the economy) all share a common interest in a weak leader with limited ability to check them. 

Those who continue to mistakenly argue that Ahmadinejad holds no real power should thus take this into consideration.  The Iranian government serves as a collection of checks upon checks upon checks.  The formation of the Expediency Committee, a body in fact brought to relevance by Rafsanjani, shows a desire to create swifter governance and efficient policy in Iran.  Ahmadinejad is without question the most ambitious, and most autonomous post-revolution president Iran has seen so far.  He has close allies in both the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council.  He is tied in with all of the Principlist factions in Iran, and shares their vision for a return to Islamic government, as opposed to Islamic republicanism. 

In fact, the reason Khamenei even started his Foreign Policy Committee was to buck the autonomy of Ahmadinejad, who continues to exert his power through diplomatic field trips and sensational rhetoric directed towards Israel and the United States.  He has come to realize that power in the country can stem from the people, and then be used against them.  This is why he ran as the economic populist, as opposed to the religious reformer (Rafsanjani’s error in 2005).  This is why he will never yield his ambition for nuclear power, which is popularly supported in the country. 

The time for power grabs in Iran may be upon us, but it just might be the skilled politician who walks away from this on top.  An economy in decline, and a factitious government in turmoil, may leave a vacuum for Ahmadinejad to fill.  Whether he act upon this for himself, or for his fundamentalist taskmasters, is irrelevant.  The results would be the same, and none of it would be good for the people of Iran.

Seizing the Human Soul

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

Forgoing all semantical arguments, I’m hoping everyone can agree that this is bad.  If you don’t see lifestyle and dress repression by the state as totalitarian, well than maybe we’re not working with the same lexicon.

Andrew is all over this:

Over a hundred have been arrested for "sex crimes" in the city where they hanged two gay teens. This has happened before, but it’s a useful sign that the regime does not control the minds of the people. 

Sullivan has also posted a very troubling video showing the public hanging of a woman in Tabriz.  I have made my own case against this Iranian regime as of late, and we need to understand what philosophical principles guide this regime.  We aren’t negotiating with a reasonable actor here.  This is why every discussion with this regime must involve at least the perceived threat of a potential military strike. 

Observe the way they deal with their own citizens.  Observe the way they extend their own influence over Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.  Observe the way their own president expatiates on the pending fate of Israel. 

Violence, sadly, is all this kind of an enemy knows.  Compulsion is the role of the state in Iran, and compulsion is all they understand.  UN sanctions and "multi-lateral" talks are all well and good, but it will all be for naught if the Big Stick isn’t resting in the corner.         

Assertions and Shackles

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

Ezra Klein seems to be confusing totalitarianism with actualized repression.  He doesn’t think Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a totalitarian because 1.  Iran allows public protests denouncing him, and 2. Ahmadinejad isn’t even the most powerful person in Iran.

I don’t believe Iran is a completely repressed nation.  This doesn’t mean Ahmadinejad isn’t a totalitarian.  It’s odd that Ezra keeps returning to the protests in Iran, since organizers and dissidents involved in those protests have been subject to arbitrary arrest and crackdowns as a result. 

A totalitarian, with all of the tools of the state at his disposal, doesn’t need to publicly beat or belittle the discontents (although he certainly has done this).  They’re not called secret police for nothing.  To argue that a state tied to Islamic law and an Islamic code of conduct is not totalitarian seems rather strange to me. 

Also, I believe Ezra’s merely splitting hairs on the second point.  Whether or not Ahmadinejad, or the regional Mullahs or the Islamic courts are calling the shots is rather moot.  ALL of these men share a totalitarian vision for Iran, and often make a "Principlist" argument for an Islamic Iran consistent with the Revolution. 

I don’t think the Iranian people want to go all Thomas Friedman on us, but I likewise reject the notion that a very young, and increasingly Westernized Iranian people share the same view as Ahmadinejad and the Mullahs.  This is in fact a clash between totalitarians and reformists.            

Reality Checks

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

Michael van der Galien has a great post up today, providing a solid argument (from a Dutch/European perspective) for why we shouldn’t be so quick to succumb to populist urges here in the States.  Michael points out that we would probably be disdained globally were we to leave Iraq prematurely, with the increased potential for genocide and sectarian strife. 

It’s our problem, and we need to fix it.  Michael makes the case:

Now, many Americans argue “we have to bring our troops home: they should not die in a far away country, if we cannot win / bring stability any time soon.” To Americans, this sounds logical. To 5.5 billion other people, this sounds extremely egotistical. The other citizens of the world say “3500?? are you kidding me? Tens of thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died, and if you withdraw prematurely, hundreds of thousands, possibly millions more will die, and you complain about 3500??? You started this war in the first place.”

I realize that the way I choose to word this might anger quite some Americans and I thought about bringing it across less bluntly, but I am not a politician: I am a blogger. And I am simply trying to explain something important to you all (the majority of whom are Americans). To those living in the other countries I ask this: don’t you agree with this post? If you look around and ask other people, isn’t what I wrote the answer the far majority gives? Yes it is harsh, but 300,000 Iraqis killed (quite a random ‘in between’ number) is quite harsh as well.

Another commenter asked (paraphrasing): how long would you want us to stay? 10 years, 20 years?

The answer of the world: as long as it takes. Again: you are responsible.

He also said why don’t you all send more troops? Two things:
- America did not want international organizations involved when the war started. Now, still, they do not want many countries involved, and if they do, they only want it because Americans are dying and it’s better for domestic purposes that foreign soldiers die (again, I’m not a politician)
- You started this war. What gives you the right to tell the world that it should send soldiers just because your refused to send enough / stay as long as it takes / work with other countries?

Please understand, I am not trying to anger all of you as much as I possibly can – I am trying to make you understand how the world perceives this debate in America.

When you talk about what the US should do, you have to take this post into account. Another commenter argued that the blowback would be only temporary. It would ‘fade away’ within a couple of years time. Right. Reality check: as one of the Dutch people I asked about that comment said, “That’s ridiculous. It will increase hatred for America for generations to come.” Again, this is basically what I am saying about this as well: it will not ‘fade away.’ The world – especially Arab peoples – will make it part of its collective memory and it will be used against the US for decades, possibly even longer. When talking about the Mideast, do not forget that they have quite a different culture than we in the West have. Holding grudges is something Arab peoples are quite good at. And this time, for quite a good reason.

My American friends, you must look at how the world will perceive an early withdrawal and a possible genocide. Take it into account. And then ask yourself: is it worth the risk? I am not saying that everyone should conclude “no, it is not worth the risk. We should stay with, say, 75,000 troops.” I am saying, however, that you should be able to deal with this, that you should take this into account. Too many Americans seem to live in some kind of bubble, shielded from the world. Too many Americans seem to have no idea how the world operates, how the world thinks. Take it into account and then come up with a plan.

But one thing should be very clear: total withdrawal will not ‘restore america’s image’ or show that America is quite moral etc. No, it will cause great, great damage.

This commentary has apparently stirred the pot quite a bit, so Michael has posted a follow-up to his initial post.  Check them both out.

UPDATE:

Jason Steck has responded at Militant Moderates. 

And there’s a final reality check up on MvdG’s home blog!  A good (and important) debate going on, so check them all out.   

The Road To Nowhere

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

There’s really no need for me to go into "The Road Home" at length.  Sunday’s NYT editorial has already gathered a lot of attention from others around the blogosphere, which a quick glance over at Memeorandum confirms.  Jules Crittenden has posted perhaps the most persuasive and thorough repudiation of the piece, while others have already lauded it for being a historic turning point in the conflict.

If you haven’t read it, please go read it.  I believe the Times (perhaps unintentionally) raises some excellent points, but I would like to specifically focus on one particular snippet:

Americans must be clear that Iraq, and the region around it, could be even bloodier and more chaotic after Americans leave. There could be reprisals against those who worked with American forces, further ethnic cleansing, even genocide. Potentially destabilizing refugee flows could hit Jordan and Syria. Iran and Turkey could be tempted to make power grabs. Perhaps most important, the invasion has created a new stronghold from which terrorist activity could proliferate.

The administration, the Democratic-controlled Congress, the United Nations and America’s allies must try to mitigate those outcomes — and they may fail. But Americans must be equally honest about the fact that keeping troops in Iraq will only make things worse.

My own words on June 27:

I believe this chunk gets at the heart of what I believe to be the Progressive Isolationist’s argument.  I don’t want to go too much into detail on that now, but one of the underlying principles appears to be that most American involvement overseas, whether it be militarily in Iraq, or psychologically in the case of Iran, is inherently bad.  If we leave Iraq, things might get better.  If Iran, Turkey and/or Saudi Arabia invade, well it’s because we failed to coddle all three of them simultaneously. 

The flaw in this logic is the assumption that we are dealing with rational actors in all three.  Do we expect the Turks to go in as peace keepers?  I think we can guess who they’ll be looking for.  The Saudis?  They made it clear that they would only invade to protect Sunni interests in the country.  And what precisely has Iran done over the past few weeks to convince you that we’re dealing with a reasonable actor there?

The only actor in this whole mess with a vested interest in seeing the creation of a stable, democratic and unified Iraq is the United States.

The Times,  perhaps boldly, acknowledges that most indicators point towards disaster in a post-occupation Iraq.  However, they seem to believe (like many occupation critics) that a continued American presence would only exacerbate these things.  They unfortunately fail to explain why this might be the case, but instead make a pretty eloquent argument for doing precisely the opposite of what they are proposing.

Foreign intervention from all sides, ethnic cleansing and the total disintegration of the Iraqi state may be the results of a withdrawal.  For this, the critics respond by offering up asylum here in America for the many displaced Iraqis.  A wonderful consolation prize for those whose nation you have just eradicated.

"Things will only get worse right before they get worse" appears to be the Grey Lady’s new mantra on Iraq.  The United States leveled a government, destabilized the country, and may very well facilitate the end of her very existence.  This is somehow preferable to the phantom outcome decried by the war critics.   

"Bring the troops home!" will be the isolationist’s rally cry, but we had better leave the body bags in Iraq.  They’ll need them.               

RIP Farfour

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

I was saddened to learn last week that Farfour, the Jew-hating Palestinian mouse, was no longer with us.  Apparently, the Zionists had had enough of him, and decided it was time for him to go.

We learned so much from Farfour, but here are the most important things:

• Israeli interrogators apparently dress like drug dealers from Miami Vice.
• Farfour, being a mouse, still had a human grandfather.
• Palestine was occupied in 1948…wink, wink. 
• Jews are bad.

So please, watch the video below, and say goodbye to Farfour in your own little way.  I’m sure he was greeted by hundreds, if not thousands, of virgin mice.

Because he’s a mouse.

toh-tal-i-tair-ee-uhn

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

Jeff Weintraub has a nice analysis on the current acts of repression going on in Iran.  Jeff points out that while some might mistakenly view this as a reaction to public displeasure, it’s in fact entirely consistent with Ahmadinejad’s platform for a more "principlist" Iran:

It’s increasingly clear that the recent arrests of several Iranian-Americans holding dual citizenship (discussed here & here & here) are part of a wider campaign of intensified political repression by the Iranian regime aimed at crushing internal dissent and, in the process, cutting off Iranians from outside contact and support.

Robin Wright’s story in the Washington Post suggests that this crackdown is partly a response to increasingly widespread and vocal discontent driven by economic distress and other grievances. But it would be misleading to see this campaign as purely reactive. Ahmadinejad and the hard-line tendencies associated with him are no doubt also seizing the opportunity to implement a long-term agenda they intended to pursue from the start–to ‘revitalize’ the theocratic regime by tightening up ideological controls, taking the country back to what they fondly remember as the intensely and monolithically committed early days of the Khomeinist revolution, and closing down the cultural and political openings of the past decade. 

Jeff’s of course right, and we certainly shouldn’t accuse Ahmadinejad of being coy on the matter.  Upon being elected, the new president declared that "the wave of the Islamic revolution will soon reach the entire world.”  He has thus far made good on this promise within his own borders, and it has become pretty obvious that the former populist won’t be tolerating upheaval from the populace.  This includes arresting college students who supposedly ridicule "hallowed institutions," arbitrarily arresting women for protesting against gender oppression and detaining Iranian-Americans on the grounds of "espionage." 

It’s really quite laughable when some argue that public protests signal just how open and free Iran is.  This is precisely what Ahmadinejad wants, and he never wastes the opportunity to point out that Iranians have "absolute, total freedom."

But totalitarians don’t need to act in the light of day, with the cameras on and the journalists scribbling.  Why do this, when you have all the resources of the state at your disposal?  In addition to the recent arrests made of protest organizers and mouthpieces, Ahmadinejad has made sure to make public display of "capital" offenders.  By hanging drug traffickers (a "capital" offense in Iran), in addition to cracking down on how women dress, the Iranian president can use the laws on the books as a way to consolidate authority and stifle dissent.

All of these ridiculous laws and policies are rationalized and codified by the government’s relationship with Islamic law.  This isn’t just intended to maintain the law, but to also dictate behavior and influence choices.  For example, a woman wearing revealing clothing may be taught with a cane to make better choices.

Ahmadinejad doesn’t need to implement radical changes in order to oppress his people, because the totalitarian infrastructure is already in place there for him to do it. 

UPDATE:

Malkin shows us just how untotalitarian this Iranian regime truly is:

You can see the rest of the photos here.  In addition to Malkin, Gateway Pundit and TMV are also on this.   

When Doves Cry

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

I could spend all day going back and forth with other bloggers on this "liberal hawk" topic, but it’ll just turn into an endless cycle.  However, Ron at Liberal Values has taken the time to once again make a nice counter-argument, so I’d like to quickly address that.

Sullivan plays the label game himself….

And…

Not only is getting out of Iraq the actual liberal position, it has become the opinion of the majority of the American people. This is not because we are isolationists or are shirking any moral obligations. It is because getting out of Iraq is what is best for both the United States and for Iraq.

1.  I would love for Ron to elaborate on how it is the liberal position to leave Iraq.  I think he and I can both agree that civil war, sectarian violence and religious tit-for-tat murder would undoubtedly continue.  I am continuously baffled like Ezra when occupation critics claim that we are the impetus for the sectarian violence.  Do occupation critics (different than invasion critics, Ron) truly believe this?  What is the logic?

Not only will we have invaded against the international community’s wishes, but we will have left a mess for other nation’s to clean up.  The Saudis already hinted at it last year, and the Turks have repeatedly "not" entered northern Iraq.  What would prevent them from doing so in our absence?  Furthermore, what would prevent Iran from doing so?  The notion that matters would improve once we left is, again, baffling. 

2.  Arguing how unpopular the war is now doesn’t make leaving Iraq the liberal thing to do.  As you may recall, Americans felt differently prior to the war.  The American public that now hates the war gave its architect glowing reviews over a year after the invasion.

I, perhaps as you did, opposed the invasion.  I didn’t buy the intelligence argument, and I saw Iraq as a distraction from more important issues (mainly finishing the job in Afghanistan, catching or killing Bin Laden, etc.).  I was in the minority then, and I’m clearly in the minority now as well.  Popular opinion doesn’t necessarily add validity to an argument, and this certainly wouldn’t be the first time president’s pushed us through unpopular wars.

Iraq is not like South Korea or Europe as Kevin argues. Staying in Iraq only gets us more bogged down in a civil war.

Why is it not like those cases?  Was rebuilding Europe easier than rebuilding Iraq?  Why so?  If you’re going to dismiss the parallel, you might as well explain why.  Again, did dropping Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal lead to peace?  Did it become any less of a terrorist training ground once we turned away?

After all this time, if the Iraqi government cannot stabilize the country over the next year, it is doubtful that staying additional years will make any difference. There’s no doubt there will be serious problems if we leave in the next year, but there will also be serious problems if we leave in two years, five years, or ten years. In the meantime, we will have more dead Americans, more money wasted, and far more people hating the United States.

Once again–baffled.  It took several years for functional governments to form in (insert one of countless examples that apparently don’t matter), and they did NOT have all of the strife and conflict that Iraq has.  Anyone who thought this would be a cursory bombing exercise like Desert Fox wasn’t paying attention.  The goal wasn’t just to topple a dictator and split, it was to aid Iraq in her recovery and democratization.  The Bush administration has failed at this…miserably…and didn’t plan properly for what an anarchic, sectarian Iraq would look like.  Well here it is.

There were other traditional methods that could’ve been used here.  We could’ve, as I mentioned, gone in and just bombed the heck out of everything like Wesley Clark.  Or, we could’ve invaded and supported any Iraqi coup that wasn’t Saddam, and maybe just have turned a blind eye while they implemented Sharia law.  What was being attempted here was without question Wilsonian interventionism (apparently another thing liberals don’t like anymore).  Centralizing federal power in Baghdad.  Protecting minorities while honoring the majority.  Revenue sharing.  Holding actual elections.

This wasn’t out of the typical Middle Eastern playbook, which incidentally has been filled with arrogant and condescending assumptions about how Arabs "can’t do" democracy for decades.  This was bold and stupid all at the same time.  The invasion went quite well, but it’s the occupation that has left our leadership embarrassed.

No other war in the history of mankind has been "live blogged" such as this (although I would mention the GOP and the Korean War were I not risking bafflement and uproar).  This doesn’t mean that any loss of life is marginal, it simply means that America has historically lost an awful lot in both victory and defeat.  The bi-polar nature of reporting on the war makes it harder for anyone to reach an objective take on it, and it doesn’t help that war critics often seem more interested in being more right than our president than they are in doing what’s truly right.

My apologies, Ron.  Nothing about that was even remotely quick.      

Whiskey Fizzle

Posted by Kevin Sullivan under Uncategorized

So the progressive isolationists over at Whiskey Fizzle have taken up the debate over the "liberal hawk."  Their primary point of contention is that the "liberal hawks" can’t respond directly to substantive and specific matters related to Iraq:

This is all my balls. Ezra Klein is perfectly right to judge people writing on foreign policy primarily on their stances towards real world issues. A discussion of "underlying beliefs or theories" in this context is absurd, given the horror of the Iraq debacle. If your "underlying beliefs or theories" made you stick your dick in the blender, even "reluctantly," and you haven’t thoroughly reassessed these concepts, I frankly don’t want to hear your advice about what to do with the weed whacker.

Highbrow stuff over at the Whiskey Fizzle. 

So let’s get specific.  The Iraq war has been the most over-analyzed war/occupation in the history of mankind.  Laptop micro-managers like the folks at Whiskey Fizzle seem to think that Iraq is a disaster because the violence hasn’t dissipated at a rate to their liking. 

Clearly, the occupation and democratization of South Korea took less than four years.  In addition to this, history has proven that once you leave a country you’ve bombed things get immediately better (just see Afghanistan, Vietnam, etc.).  After all, had we pulled out of Europe following World War II they would’ve been much better off there.  The Soviet Union certainly wouldn’t have marched on all of Europe, and global institutions like the UN, World Bank and NATO clearly would’ve come about on their own. 

It’s the LIBERAL who is in fact being quite specific here.  Progressive isolationists like the folks at Whiskey Fizzle want to simply talk about Iraq, because they opposed the invasion and see that as a litmus for all future military engagements.  I can’t fault them for opposing the invasion…many LIBERALS did.  But the LIBERAL sees a moral obligation in staying in Iraq, whereas the progressive isolationist seems more interested in "gotcha" politics. 

So tell me, if we pat you on the back and tell you that you were right about the invasion, will you stop handicapping our foreign policy?  Pretty please?